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Abstract
The cognitive reflection test (CRT) became popular for its impressive power to pre-
dict how well people reason and make decisions. Despite the popularity of the CRT,
a major issue complicates its interpretation: The numerical nature of the CRT con-
founds reflection ability with mathematical ability. We have addressed this issue by
developing the verbal CRT (CRT-V), a novel 10-item measure of cognitive reflection
(https://osf.io/xehbv/), using nonmathematical problems with good statistical and
psychometric properties and with low familiarity. First, we selected suitable items
with relatively low familiarity and optimal difficulty as identified in two different
populations (Studies 1 and 2) and with high content validity as judged by an expert
panel (Study 3). Second, we demonstrated good criterion and construct validity for
the test in different populations with a wide range of variables (Studies 4–6, 8) and a
good internal consistency (Studies 4–8) and test–retest reliability (Study 7). The CRT-
V was less associated with math anxiety, objective and subjective numeracy than the
original CRT, and it was test equivalent across gender, age groups and administration
setting. In contrast with the original CRT (Hedge's g = 0.29, 95% confidence interval
[CI] [0.17, 0.40]), the CRT-V showed no gender differences (Hedge's g = −0.06, 95%
CI [−0.18, 0.06]). The CRT-V can complement existing, numerical, tests of cognitive
reflection.
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1 | MEASURING COGNITIVE REFLECTION
WITHOUT MATHS: DEVELOPMENT AND
VALIDATION OF THE CRT-V
The cognitive reflection test (hereafter, CRT) is believed to measure
the ability to suppress an initial (incorrect) intuition and to cognitively
reflect when solving three mathematical problems (Frederick, 2005).
For instance, in a ‘lily pad’ problem, people attempt to solve this verbal
problem: ‘In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch
doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire
lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?’
(Frederick, 2005, p. 27). Participants should suppress the intuitively
appealing incorrect response of 24 days, which they likely generate
due to a linear representation of the patch of lily increase (because
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48/2 = 24 days), and answer 47 days to provide a correct response
(because 48 − 1 = 47 days), which assumes the correct representation
of an exponential increase of the lily pad area.
The CRT rapidly gained popularity due to its impressive power to
predict how well people reason, judge and decide as well as to predict
what they believe in (for a review see Pennycook, Fugelsang, &
Koehler, 2015a). Better CRT scores have been associated with lower
susceptibility to biases in deductive reasoning, such as belief bias in
syllogistic reasoning (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011), with lower
susceptibility to biases in judgments and decisions as measured in tra-
ditional heuristic-and-biases tasks such as base rate neglect, denomina-
tor neglect and conjunction fallacy (Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, &
Pardo, 2012; Sirota, Juanchich, & Hagmayer, 2014; Toplak et al., 2011;
Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014) and with normatively better choices
and more favourable real-life decision outcomes (Campitelli & Labollita,
2010; Frederick, 2005; Juanchich, Dewberry, Sirota, & Narendran,
2016). The test also predicts utilitarian moral reasoning (Baron, Scott,
Fincher, & Emlen Metz, 2015; Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2012), para-
normal beliefs, including belief in God (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012;
Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012), receptivity to
profound bullshit (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang,
2015) and perceived accuracy of fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2018).
Besides, the items are often used in experimental research as an indi-
cator of reflective thinking (e.g., De Neys, Rossi, & Houde, 2013;
Johnson, Tubau, & De Neys, 2016; Sirota, Theodoropoulou, &
Juanchich, 2020; Travers, Rolison, & Feeney, 2016). The CRT has
become an embodiment of rational thinking that leads to theoretical
commitments: any significant prediction patterns by the CRT have
implicated that the intuition inhibition and/or cognitive reflection is
an important cognitive process behind the predicted effect.
Despite its widespread use and success, several issues complicate
the interpretation of the CRT and threaten its continued use. First and
most importantly, the numerical nature of the CRT items confounds
reflection ability with numeracy skills. Indeed, evidence indicates a
strong association of the CRT with measures of objective numeracy
(e.g., Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Liberali et al., 2012; Mastrogiorgio,
2015; Pennycook & Ross, 2016; Sirota & Juanchich, 2011). The con-
founding is so strong that some authors have proposed that the CRT
captures only numerical ability, with mathematical skills being the sole
key mechanism responsible for the link between cognitive reflection
and normative judgment and decision-making performance (Sinayev &
Peters, 2015). The CRT items have even been integrated with numer-
acy items to create a novel numeracy test (Weller et al., 2013). How-
ever, other authors have suggested that the CRT also measures—in
addition to numerical ability—the disposition to think analytically
because cognitive reflection scores predict variables such as religious
beliefs, which cannot be accounted for solely by numerical ability
(Pennycook & Ross, 2016). Either way, both groups of authors agree
that numeracy is an important predictive component of the CRT. The
confounding might yield theoretical confusion as to whether the exis-
ting prediction is driven by cognitive reflection or by numeracy. It also
leads to other undesirable consequences such as the gender perfor-
mance gap: females consistently perform less well in the CRT than
males (e.g., a meta-study of 118 studies, Brañas-Garza, Kujal, &
Lenkei, 2019). Recent evidence suggests that this is due to gender
differences in mathematical ability and related mathematical anxiety
rather than differences in cognitive reflection (Juanchich, Sirota, &
Bonnefon, 2020; Primi, Donati, Chiesi, & Morsanyi, 2018).
Two additional issues should be mentioned. First, the statistical and
psychometric properties of the CRT are suboptimal. The distribution of
the CRT is often severely positively skewed and sometimes results in
flooring effects, especially in nonstudent samples (e.g., Brañas-Garza
et al., 2019; Sirota et al., 2014); the three-item version has low internal
consistency (Baron et al., 2015). Second, an increasing proportion of
participants tested with the CRT are already familiar with it, both in
terms of prior exposure and knowledge of the items. Self-reported prior
exposure substantially increases performance in the test (e.g., Bialek &
Pennycook, 2017; Haigh, 2016; Stieger & Reips, 2016). However,
recent studies suggested that self-reported prior exposure does not
diminish the predictive validity of the test (Bialek & Pennycook, 2017;
Šrol, 2018b), and nor does actual (not self-reported) prior exposure
increase performance on it (Meyer, Zhou, & Frederick, 2018). Despite
the reassuring findings on prior exposure, the effect of knowledge of
the items on the predictive validity remains unclear. Hence, there is a
need for alternative measures of cognitive reflection that would
address the issue of numeracy confounding while exhibiting excellent
psychometric and statistical characteristics and low recognisability.
Recently, several extended and alternative versions of the CRT
have been developed. Toplak et al. (2014) developed an extended ver-
sion of the CRT by adding four new mathematical items to the original
three items (a multiple-choice version of this extension was developed
by Sirota & Juanchich, 2018). Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati, and
Hamilton (2016) also created an extended version of the CRT (CRT-L)
by adding three new mathematical problems to the original three-item
version. Finally, Baron et al. (2015) developed several expanded ver-
sions of the CRT either by adding items from belief bias measures,
mathematical problems parallel to the original items or syllogisms to
the original CRT items. The extensions improved the statistical and
psychometric properties of the CRT and reduced—at least to some
extent—the problem with item familiarity. Unfortunately, these exten-
sions did not fully address the problem of numeracy confounding
because they still featured items requiring mathematical operations. To
address the latter issue, Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) developed
a four-item version of the CRT (CRT-2). The correlation of numeracy
with the CRT-2, though not eliminated, was substantially lower, and
the gender differences were smaller (decreased from d = 0.88 to 0.26).
However, some of the items masqueraded themselves as mathematical
problems requiring computations (e.g., ‘A farmer had 15 sheep and all
but 8 died. How many are left? Intuitive answer: 7; correct answer: 8’),
which could still be a problem due to the mathematical anxiety that
such problems might trigger (Juanchich et al., 2020; Primi et al., 2018).
Besides, the psychometric properties of the measure were still sub-
optimal (e.g., Cronbach's α was around 0.5). Hence, although the
extensions and alternative CRTs are very useful, none have developed
a fully nonmathematical version of the CRT capable of addressing the
psychometric and statistical concerns discussed above.
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1.1 | Present research
In the present research, we aimed to develop and validate a new CRT
that would address all three limitations described above: the verbal
CRT (CRT-V). To do so, first, we aimed to identify verbal problems
similar to those used in the original CRT (i.e., eliciting a prevailing intu-
itive incorrect answer and having one unequivocally correct answer).
The selected items should fulfil the following criteria: (a) not require
any calculations to address the issue of confounding with numeracy,
(b) have an appropriate level of difficulty and good psychometric scal-
ing properties to address the issues of poor statistical and psychomet-
ric properties and (c) have a low prior familiarity to address the issue
of familiarity. We conducted three studies to assess whether the
items fulfilled the criteria described above (Studies 1 and 2) and to
assess its content validity (Study 3). We have reported the process of
the item identification and selection along with the three studies in
Part A: Development of the CRT-V.
Second, we aimed to test the validity and reliability of the final
set of items in both laboratory-controlled conditions as well as in
diverse online panels, while testing both student and general adult
populations and using a range of outcome variables. Because the test
is intended for use in a wide variety of settings, it was important to
examine its validity and reliability in a variety of settings also. We con-
ducted five studies assessing evidence of the construct validity of the
CRT-V using a wide range of variables (Studies 4–6, 8) and assessing
the evidence on its internal consistency (Studies 4–8) and test–retest
reliability (Study 7). We have reported the process of assessing valid-
ity and reliability with the five studies in Part B: Validity and Reliability
of the CRT-V.
2 | PART A: DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRT-V
To develop the CRT-V, we followed a four-step procedure: item gen-
eration, item screening, item testing and factor structure phase
(Figure 1).
2.1 | Item generation and screening
In the item generation phase, the authors identified 46 items (either
via internet searches with the links provided in the Supporting infor-
mation or generated by themselves) that would (a) have an appealing
(incorrect) intuitive answer (i.e., the item would not require partici-
pants to think), (b) have one reasonably justifiable correct answer and
(c) not require mathematical operations or number manipulation to
solve the problem correctly.
In the item screening phase, two authors (M.S. and A.M.)
screened the items to ensure that they were aligned with the criteria
set up in the first phase to check for duplicates and to identify any
other issues which would render them inappropriate to use. We
excluded 20 items. Nine were excluded due to content duplicity/
structural similarity with an included item. (Note: We nevertheless
kept two similar items, Items 1 and 2, to compare their performance.)
Seven items were excluded because they did not meet one of the
item development criteria from Phase 1 (e.g., they used mathematical
operation or the correct response was not unequivocally correct) and
four items were excluded for some other reason (e.g., requiring spe-
cific local knowledge or due to social desirability which would prevent
people from noting down an intuitive answer). Thus, the screening
process resulted in a set of 26 eligible items. So, from the 46 generated
items, 20 were screened out in this phase.
2.2 | Item testing and factor structure
In the item testing phase, we tested the psychometric properties of
the 26 items at the item level. Specifically, we examined item diffi-
culty, the proportion of the intuitive incorrect answers and familiarity
in two different samples often exposed to cognitive reflection items
(Study 1: U.K. sample and Study 2: U.S. sample) and content validity
using an expert panel (Study 3). The details of the item level analyses
are reported below. The item testing phase resulted in 12 eligible
items.
In the factor structure phase, we used confirmatory factor analy-
sis (CFA) to model the 12 items and their loadings on the latent vari-
able of cognitive reflection. The details of the modelling are reported
below. This phase yielded a 10-item CRT-V that had an excellent fit
for the proposed single-construct cognitive reflection model in both
samples.
2.3 | Studies 1 to 3
2.3.1 | Method
Participants and design
Study 1. We aimed to recruit at least 200 participants in order to esti-
mate the difficulty and discriminability of the items. A sample of
F IGURE 1 Four phases of development of the verbal cognitive
reflection test (CRT) (flow diagram)
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203 participants recruited from an online panel Prolific Academic
(54.2%men, age ranged from 18 to 63 years,M = 31.1, SD = 10.2 years)
completed the online survey. They were paid for their up to 20-min
participation by a flat fee of £2. The sample was heterogeneous in
terms of education (1% had not finished high school, 30.5% had fin-
ished high school, 48.3% had an undergraduate degree, 18.2% had a
master's degree and 2.0% had a doctoral or professional degree) and
occupation (27.6% of participants were unemployed, homemakers or
students, 25.1% were working as managers and professionals, 9.9%
were working in sales and office, 7.4% were working in service and
the remaining 30.0% were in some other occupation). The study fea-
tured a nonexperimental design. The blocks of 26 verbal problems,
their familiarity, three numerical problems and their familiarity
occurred in a fixed order and the items within each block were pres-
ented in a randomised order to each participant.
Study 2. A sample of 252 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (55.2%
men, age ranged from 19 to 72 years, M = 36.4, SD = 11.5 years) com-
pleted the online survey. They were paid for their up to 20-min partic-
ipation a flat fee of $2.40. The sample was heterogeneous in terms of
education (0.8% had not finished high school, 32.5% had finished high
school, 54.8% had an undergraduate degree, 10.3% had a master's
degree and 1.6% had a doctoral or professional degree) and occupa-
tion (24.2% were working as managers and professionals, 17.9% were
working in sales and office, 17.1% were unemployed, homemakers or
students, 12.3% were working in service and the remaining 28.5%
were in some other occupation). The design was the same as in
Study 1.
Study 3. An expert panel (n = 4, two female and two male researchers,
age Mdn = 41.5 years) was asked to assess the appropriateness of the
individual items. The experts were academic psychologists and had at
least 10 years of research experience since receiving their PhD at the
time of assessment (namely, 10, 11, 12 and 40 years), and they were
research active in the area of intuitive and analytical cognitive
processing as documented by their conference and peer-reviewed
journal contributions. The study featured a nonexperimental design in
which the experts assessed the appropriateness of the 26 verbal prob-
lems presented in a randomised order.
Materials and procedure
Study 1. After providing informed consent, participants completed
26 verbal problems (see Supporting information), and, in turn, they
assessed the familiarity of the 26 verbal problems. Participants then
completed the three-item version of the numerical CRT
(Frederick, 2005) and, in turn, assessed the familiarity of the items
using the same question used for the verbal problems. They then pro-
vided their age, gender, occupation and education level before being
debriefed. We coded the correct and intuitive answers using an
agreed coding scheme (see Supporting information).
Study 2. The materials and procedure were identical to those in
Study 1.
Study 3. After providing informed consent, the experts assessed the
appropriateness of the 26 verbal problems using a 4-point Likert scale
(1: not appropriate, 2: somewhat appropriate, 3: quite appropriate and 4:
very appropriate). The experts were told that all, some or none of the
26 items could be considered appropriate. For each item, we provided
information describing the intuitive (wrong) answer and the correct
answer to help the experts to assess the suitability of each item.
Finally, the experts completed a short socio-demographic section and
were debriefed.
2.3.2 | Results
Item testing
First, we conducted item-level analyses using the R package ‘psycho-
metric’ (Fletcher & Fletcher, 2010). In Table 1, we have reported item
difficulty (and its standard deviation), item discriminability, item-total
correlation and item-criterion correlation (where the criterion is the
numerical CRT) as well as item's intuitive responses proportion
(i.e., the proportion of wrong ‘intuitive’ responses out of all responses)
and familiarity for Studies 1 and 2. In Table 1, we have also reported
the medians of the appropriateness judgments made by the experts in
Study 3. We interpreted these judgments with extreme caution
because the intercoder reliability of the experts was not different
from a chance level, Krippendorff's α = −0.05. This evidence was
always assessed in a context of other supportive evidence; as a matter
of fact, none of the items was excluded based on this evidence. We
nevertheless report these findings here for full transparency.
The cut-off points for most of the necessary and supportive
criteria for item inclusion in the scale were derived from the recom-
mendations in the psychometric literature (AERA, APA, &
NCME, 2014; Furr, 2017; Gregory, 2004). For an item to be included
in the CRT-V, it had to fulfil three necessary criteria: (a) item difficulty
should be higher than 20% and lower than 70% in both samples,
(b) item intuitive response proportion (i.e., the proportion of the intui-
tive, incorrect, responses) had to be at least 30%, (c) the initial famil-
iarity of the items should be 40% or lower. In addition, we took into
account the following supportive evidence when considering including
the item: (a) experts' judgment of content validity of the item equal or
higher than Mdn = 3 and item-level content validity index (i-CVi) of
.50 or higher (but this was interpreted with extreme caution),
(b) discrimination index (i.e., differentiating lower and upper half of
responses) higher than 0.25, (c) item-total reliability higher than 0.20,
(d) item-criterion correlation higher than 0.10. Based on these criteria,
we selected 13 items (Table 1). Items 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 15,
16, 22 and 26 fulfilled the necessary conditions and fulfilled additional
criteria in the supportive evidence category. There were three excep-
tions to the latter: Items 13 and 26 had a lower than the rec-
ommended median for the experts' judgments of appropriateness, and
Item 16 had a low item-criterion correlation in the U.K. sample. We
decided, however, to keep these three items for the next phase
because they fulfilled the necessary criteria and the additional criteria
from the category of supportive evidence. We excluded Item
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2 because of its structural similarity with item 1. Hence, the set of
items entered into the factor structure phase featured 12 items.
Factor structure
Using the Mplus software, we conducted a CFA on all 12 items in the
U.K. data set. A one-factor model was used as an indicator of the
latent variable of cognitive reflection. The fit of the model to the
U.K. data was very good, χ2(54) = 66.91, p = .11, RMSEA = .034 (95%
CI [0.000, 0.059]), TLI = .982. However, an inspection of the item
response theory (IRT) item discrimination values indicated that two
items (Items 22 and 26) were noticeably less good at discriminating
between participants on the latent variable than the remaining 10.
These two items also had factor loadings which were barely
satisfactory (.32) or unsatisfactory (.23). After removing these two
items, we carried out a 10-item CFA, using a one-factor solution. This
model had an excellent fit, χ2(35) = 35.16, p = .46, RMSEA = .005 (95%
CI [0.000, 0.051]), TLI = 1.00. All IRT item discrimination values were
significant at p < .001. The factor structure of these 10 items was then
cross-validated using the U.S. data set. In this case a CFA based on a
one-factor model had an excellent fit: χ2(35) = 28.68, p = .77,
RMSEA = .000 (95% CI [0.000, 0.032]), TLI = 1.00. Again, all IRT item
discrimination values were significant at p < .001. The factor loadings
for both samples are shown in Table 2.
To summarise, in the four-stage process, we generated 46 items,
20 of which were screened out. Based on the item level analysis, we
kept only 12 items out of the 26 eligible items. Finally, based on the
TABLE 1 Item analysis in two samples (Studies 1 and 2) and expert judgments of item-level content validity (Study 3)
Study 1 (U.K. sample, n = 203) Study 2 (U.S. sample, n = 252) Study 3
Item ID M (SD) DI ITC ICC Int. Fam. ID M (SD) DI ITC ICC Int. Fam. Exp. (Mdn) i-CVI Excl.
1 .57 (.50) .61 .53 .22 .44 .35 .46 (.50) .73 .31 .31 .39 .23 3.0 .50 I
2 .61 (.49) .67 .58 .16 .50 .33 .49 (.50) .83 .37 .37 .38 .21 3.0 .75 Ea
3 .61 (.49) .64 .59 .29 .12 .26 .50 (.50) .79 .35 .35 .06 .15 3.0 .50 E
4 .70 (.46) .45 .41 .17 .32 .40 .63 (.48) .54 .34 .34 .30 .16 3.5 .75 I
5 .66 (.47) .72 .65 .29 .27 .33 .60 (.49) .81 .32 .32 .15 .26 3.0 .75 I
6 .65 (.48) .67 .63 .20 .34 .13 .50 (.50) .82 .29 .29 .21 .05 3.0 .75 I
7 .66 (.48) .67 .62 .29 .42 .24 .56 (.50) .87 .30 .30 .33 .11 3.5 .75 I
8 .92 (.28) .15 .32 .08 .13 .73 .84 (.37) .39 .36 .36 .05 .52 2.0 .25 E
9 .51 (.50) .73 .61 .34 .45 .53 .51 (.50) .75 .31 .31 .44 .38 3.5 .75 E
10 .82 (.38) .42 .50 .26 .21 .44 .75 (.43) .49 .23 .23 .16 .25 3.5 .75 E
11 .39 (.49) .61 .58 .24 .63 .39 .27 (.44) .54 .26 .26 .53 .31 3.0 .75 I
12 .32 (.47) .49 .47 .19 .11 .17 .31 (.46) .49 .22 .22 .06 .12 2.0 .25 E
13 .48 (.50) .66 .60 .20 .49 .22 .37 (.48) .63 .30 .30 .42 .11 2.0 .25 I
14 .52 (.50) .72 .60 .26 .34 .33 .44 (.50) .76 .34 .34 .30 .19 2.5 .50 I
15 .46 (.50) .64 .54 .34 .29 .21 .33 (.47) .70 .30 .30 .20 .13 3.0 .75 I
16 .47 (.50) .54 .45 .07 .60 .15 .35 (.48) .61 .25 .25 .50 .09 3.0 .75 I
17 .60 (.49) .70 .60 .26 .42 .20 .57 (.50) .67 .19 .19 .37 .12 1.5 .25 E
18 .46 (.50) .34 .30 .29 .28 .09 .34 (.48) .42 .28 .28 .18 .04 2.0 .25 E
19 .31 (.46) .31 .32 .31 .42 .19 .21 (.41) .21 .10 .10 .36 .12 3.0 .75 E
20 .72 (.45) .30 .32 .33 .30 .22 .58 (.50) .50 .17 .17 .20 .12 3.0 .75 E
21 .27 (.44) .46 .44 .18 .50 .18 .19 (.39) .44 .21 .21 .39 .08 3.0 .75 E
22 .32 (.47) .36 .38 .29 .50 .18 .36 (.48) .51 .22 .22 .52 .10 2.0 .25 Ib
23 .51 (.50) .30 .30 .18 .29 .13 .65 (.48) .25 .16 .16 .35 .08 2.0 .25 E
24 .49 (.50) .46 .40 .20 .08 .10 .49 (.50) .51 .21 .21 .07 .06 2.0 .25 E
25 .76 (.43) .28 .35 .23 .20 .08 .75 (.43) .37 .24 .24 .16 .06 3.5 1.00 E
26 .38 (.49) .30 .26 .11 .23 .10 .49 (.50) .40 .33 .33 .20 .08 2.5 .50 Ib
Note: Labels (cut-off points) ID = item difficulty (>.20, <.70), DI = discrimination index (< .25), ITC = item-total correlation (>.20), ICC = item-criterion corre-
lation (<.20), Int. = intuitive responses proportion (>.30), Fam. = familiarity (<.40), Exp. (Mdn) = median value of the experts' judgments (≥3), CVI = item-level
content validity index (>.50), Excl. = exclusion (E = excluded, I = included).
aThe item fulfilled the criteria but was excluded due to duplicity with item 1.
bThese items were included in the initial model but were dropped from the final version of the test. See the wording of all 26 items in the Supporting
information.
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series of CFAs, we identified 10 items with satisfactory loadings. We
used the final 10-item version of the CRT-V in the subsequent studies
to assess its construct validity and reliability.
3 | PART B: VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY
OF THE CRT-V
After constructing a measure with desirable characteristics, we con-
ducted five studies that aimed to assessed evidence of construct
validity (convergent and discriminant validity evidence as well as pre-
dictive validity evidence) of the CRT-V using different constructs
(Studies 4–6, 8) as well as evidence of reliability, specifically, internal
consistency (Studies 4–8) and test–retest reliability (Study 7). To
increase the generalisability of our findings, we conducted our studies
in different samples: we used student samples for which we collected
the data in a controlled laboratory environment (Studies 4 and 5) and
online panel samples (Studies 6–8).
3.1 | Study 4
To assess the evidence of the construct validity of the CRT-V, we
designed an extensive validation study and conducted it in controlled
TABLE 2 Confirmatory factor analysis loadings of the verbal CRT 10 items on the cognitive reflection latent variable (U.K. and U.S. samples)
Item Num. CRT item Factor loading (U.K. sample) Factor loading (U.S. sample)
1 [1] Mary's father has 5 daughters but no sons—Nana,
Nene, Nini, Nono. What is the fifth daughter's name
probably? correct answer: Mary, intuitive answer:
Nunu
.67 .71
2 [4] If you were running a race, and you passed the person
in 2nd place, what place would you be in now?
correct answer: 2nd, intuitive answer: 1st
.40 .59
3 [5] It is a stormy night and a plane takes off from JFK
airport in New York. The storm worsens, and the
plane crashes-half lands in the United States, the
other half lands in Canada. In which country do you
bury the survivors? correct answer: we do not bury
survivors, intuitive answer: USA
.78 .89
4 [6] A monkey, a squirrel, and a bird are racing to the top of
a coconut tree. Who will get the banana first, the
monkey, the squirrel, or the bird? correct answer:
there is no banana on a coconut tree, intuitive answer:
bird
.79 .87
5 [7] In a one-storey pink house, there was a pink person, a
pink cat, a pink fish, a pink computer, a pink chair, a
pink table, a pink telephone, a pink shower—
everything was pink! What colour were the stairs
probably? correct answer: no stairs in a one-storey
house, intuitive answer: pink
.81 .90
6 [11] How many of each animal did Moses put on the ark?
correct answer: none, intuitive answer: two
.74 .73
7 [13] The wind blows west. An electric train runs east. In
which cardinal direction does the smoke from the
locomotive blow? correct answer: no smoke from an
electric train, intuitive answer: west
.74 .64
8 [14] If you have only one match and you walk into a dark
room where there is an oil lamp, a newspaper and
wood— which thing would you light first? correct
answer: match, intuitive answer: oil lamp
.79 .81
9 [15] Would it be ethical for a man to marry the sister of his
widow? correct answer: not possible, intuitive answer:
no
.60 .77
10 [16] Which sentence is correct: (a) ‘the yolk of the egg are
white’ or (b) ‘the yolk of the egg is white’? correct
answer: the yolk is yellow, intuitive answer: b
.50 .63
Note: Item's number in squared brackets [] refers to the original number of the item as reported in Table 1.
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laboratory conditions. To assess the convergent and discriminant
validity evidence of the CRT-V, we measured cognitive reflection
(i.e., the numerical CRT), cognitive ability and executive functions,
working memory, thinking dispositions and numeracy. Prior research
found weak to medium positive correlations between cognitive ability,
working memory and executive functions, thinking dispositions,
numeracy and the numerical CRT (Frederick, 2005; Liberali
et al., 2012; Toplak et al., 2011, 2014; Toplak, West, &
Stanovich, 2017). We expected to find similar correlation patterns for
cognitive ability, working memory, executive functioning and thinking
dispositions in terms of direction even though not necessarily of the
same strength due to numeracy confounding the relationships with
the numerical CRT. Due to the nonmathematical nature of the prob-
lems used, we also expected a lower correlation between the CRT-V
and numeracy than between the numerical CRT and numeracy. For
the same reason, we expected to find a medium rather than a strong
positive correlation between the CRT-V and the numerical CRT.
To assess predictive validity evidence, we measured indicators
associated with rational thought (or lack of it): belief bias, denominator
neglect, Bayesian reasoning as well as risk preference, time preference
and moral reasoning. Prior research found weak correlations between
these measures and the numerical CRT (Baron et al., 2015; Paxton
et al., 2012; Sirota et al., 2014; Sirota & Juanchich, 2018; Toplak
et al., 2011, 2014). We expected to find similar patterns of results,
although we expected attenuated correlations due to the role of
numeracy that is usually correlated with these biases (e.g., Sirota &
Juanchich, 2018). For example, we found weak to medium correla-
tions between numeracy and the measures used here (e.g., belief bias,
denominator neglect, thinking dispositions) when we reanalysed our
data reported elsewhere (Sirota & Juanchich, 2018). Controlling for
numeracy attenuated the correlations (e.g., the correlation with
denominator neglect dropped from r = −34 to rp = −21).
3.1.1 | Method
Participants and design
We aimed to recruit at least 258 participants in order to detect at
least a weak correlation of r = 0.2, assuming α = .05, 1 − β = .90 and a
conservative two-tailed test (Cohen, 1988; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007). We also assumed a 5% attrition rate (e.g., due to
technical issues and incomplete questionnaires). As a result, 270 par-
ticipants (70% female; age ranged from 18 to 62 years, M = 22.3,
SD = 5.2 years) took part in the study. They were recruited from the
University of Essex's voluntary participation pool. Participants were
mostly students (86.3%) or they were in other occupations (13.7%).
They were heterogeneous in terms of education (37.8% had finished
high school, 44.4% had completed an undergraduate degree, 16.3%
had completed a master's degree and 1.5% had a doctoral or another
professional degree). Participants were proficient in English: 41.5%
were native British citizens; the remaining 58.5% nonnative British cit-
izens had substantial experience in learning English (M = 15.4,
SD = 5.8 years) and had been living in the United Kingdom for a
relatively long time (M = 2.9, SD = 3.0 years). Participants were paid
£12 for their participation for an estimated 1 h and 45 min which
included a 10-min optional break. This was a correlational design; all
the measures were presented to participants in random order.
Materials and procedure
After providing informed consent, participants completed the test bat-
tery of 17 tasks administered using Inquisit Millisecond software ver-
sion 4 (Draine, 2014). Except for the target CRT-V, we measured
variables that would allow us to assess construct validity. To assess
convergent and discriminant validity evidence, we measured the
numerical CRT, cognitive ability (matrix and vocabulary reasoning) and
executive functions variables (set shifting and response inhibition),
working memory variables (N-back task), thinking dispositions
(actively open-minded thinking, need for cognition and belief in intui-
tion) and numeracy. To assess predictive validity evidence, we mea-
sured several variables usually predicted by the numerical CRT: belief
bias, denominator neglect, Bayesian reasoning, risk preference, time
preference and moral reasoning.
Verbal CRT. To measure the CRT-V, we used the 10 items identified in
the construction phase to measure cognitive reflection free from
mathematical problems. The scale had good internal consistency
(Cronbach's α = 0.80). The summation score ranged from 0 to
10, where higher scores indicated higher cognitive reflection.
Convergent and discriminant validity evidence measures
Numerical CRT. We used the extended, seven-item version of the
numerical CRT that included the three original CRT items because the
extended version had more desirable psychometric and statistical
properties than the original CRT (Šrol, 2018a; Toplak et al., 2014). The
scale had an acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach's α = 0.71).
The summation score ranged from 0 to 7; higher scores indicated
higher cognitive reflection.
Cognitive ability: Vocabulary and matrix reasoning. We measured verbal
and nonverbal cognitive ability using the vocabulary and matrix rea-
soning subtests from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence
(Wechsler, 1999). The vocabulary reasoning subtest consisted of
34 words, and the participants were instructed to explain a word
(e.g., ‘panacea’). We used the provided standardised coding system:
zero points for providing an incorrect meaning (e.g., ‘panic’ for the
item ‘panacea’), one point for a close or partial meaning (e.g., ‘cure’ for
the item ‘panacea’) and two points for providing a complete and pre-
cise meaning of the word (e.g., ‘remedy for all difficulties’ for the item
‘panacea’). The vocabulary reasoning subtest had a good internal con-
sistency (Cronbach's α = 0.83). The summation score ranged from 0 to
68; higher scores indicated higher verbal ability.
The matrix reasoning subtest consisted of 35 tasks, each rep-
resenting a sequence of matrices. Participants were instructed to
complete each sequence with the most appropriate shape out of five
shown underneath the matrix. Participants were provided with two
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practice trials. The matrix reasoning subtest had a good internal con-
sistency (Cronbach's α = 0.85). The summation scores ranged from
0 to 35; higher scores indicated higher nonverbal ability.
Executive function: Set shifting and response inhibition. We measured
set shifting ability—the ability to shift attention between one task and
another—using The Trailmaking Test (Reitan, 1955, 1958). It contained
two subtests. The first subtest required participants to join the numbers
1–25 in an ascending order. The second subtest required participants
to join the numbers 1–13 and the letters A–L in an ascending order by
alternating between numerical and alphabetical items. We subtracted
the time taken on subtest one from the time taken on the more difficult
subtest two. Higher positive scores reflected a reduced ability to alter-
nate between numerical and alphabetical items.
In addition, we measured response inhibition ability—the ability to
suppress a prepotent response—using the stop signal task
(Verbruggen, Logan, & Stevens, 2008). Participants were presented
with a left or right-facing arrow and were instructed to press the
corresponding arrow keyboard key as quickly as possible. However,
participants had to inhibit this response on 25% of the trials, in which
the arrow was accompanied by a sound. The auditory stop signal was
presented using an adaptive stop-signal delay (initially set to 250 ms
and increased by 50 ms if inhibition was successful). The task included
a practice phase of 32 trials, followed by three experimental blocks of
64 trials. The main dependent measure used here was the mean prob-
ability of responding to the trials accompanied by a sound, which indi-
cated the probability of failed inhibitions. Higher scores indicated a
lower ability to inhibit the go-process. We used this measure instead
of covert stop-signal reaction time because it would not be a suitable
measure for subjects who inhibited more or less than 50% of the time
(Verbruggen et al., 2008), which in our case would result in a loss of
43.2% of valid cases and would not have satisfied the minimal power
expectations.
Working memory: N-back task. We assessed working memory using a
single pictorial N-back task (Jaeggi et al., 2010). In this task, partici-
pants monitored a sequence of eight different shapes and had to
press a button whenever the stimulus currently presented on the
screen matched the one that was shown either two or three positions
back (the two- or three-back versions of the task, the three-back ver-
sion being more difficult). The task included one block of 10 practice
trials for each n-level and three blocks of 20 experimental trials for
each n-level (i.e., six experimental blocks). In each experimental block,
six out of 20 trials included a target. The working memory score was
computed as the proportion of total hits minus the proportion of total
false alarms and divided by the total number of experimental blocks.
Higher scores indicated better working memory.
Thinking dispositions: Actively open-minded thinking beliefs, need for cog-
nition and faith in intuition. We assessed thinking disposition (beliefs
about open-mindedness) using the 11-item version of the actively
open-minded thinking scale (Baron, 2008; Stanovich & West, 1998).
Participants expressed their agreement with 11 statements
concerning beliefs about open-minded thinking on a 5-point Likert
scale (anchored at 1: completely disagree to 5: completely agree). The
items were presented in random order. The scale had satisfactory
internal consistency (Cronbach's α = 0.67). The average score ranged
from 1 to 5; higher scores indicated stronger beliefs in open-minded
thinking.
We also assessed two additional thinking dispositions—need for
cognition and faith in intuition—using the 10-item version of the
rational-experiential inventory (Norris, Pacini, & Epstein, 1998; Pacini
& Epstein, 1999). In the need for cognition subscale, participants
assessed how well five statements concerning thinking could describe
them using a 5-point Likert scale (anchored at 1: completely false to 5:
completely true). The scale had satisfactory internal consistency
(Cronbach's α = 0.68). The average need for cognitive score ranged
from 1 to 5; higher scores indicated the higher need for cognition. In
the faith in intuition subscale, participants assessed how well five
statements concerning intuition described them using a 5-point Likert
scale (anchored at 1: completely false to 5: completely true). The scale
had satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach's α = 0.74). The aver-
age faith in intuition score ranged from 1 to 5; higher scores indicated
a greater tendency to believe in intuitive thinking.
Numeracy. We measured numeracy using the Lipkus numeracy scale,
a very common measure of numerical ability (Lipkus, Samsa, &
Rimer, 2001). It consists of 11 simple mathematical word problems
that require an understanding of basic probability concepts such as
the ability to convert percentages to proportions and the ability to
compare different risk magnitudes. The items were presented in a ran-
dom order to each participant. The scale had an acceptable internal
consistency (Cronbach's α = 0.60). The summation index ranged from
0 to 11; higher scores indicated better numeracy.
Predictive validity evidence measures. We selected six benchmark tasks
traditionally associated with rational thought. These tasks comprised
belief bias in syllogistic reasoning (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983;
Markovits & Nantel, 1989), denominator neglect (Kirkpatrick &
Epstein, 1992), Bayesian reasoning (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995), risk
preference (Frederick, 2005), time preference (Frederick, 2005) and
moral reasoning (Paxton et al., 2012). (Note: Please see Supporting
information for the exact wording of the problems and further meth-
odological details.) Finally, participants completed some socio-
demographic questions and were debriefed.
Missing values and data exclusion. We identified several missing
values due to faults in the program: one missing value for the
vocabulary reasoning subtest, one missing value in the trail making
Task, three missing values in the stop signal task and three missing
values in the N-back task. We also checked the assumptions of
normal distribution and three variables were severely skewed.
Upon examination, these were due to a few very extreme scores.
We, therefore, excluded all the values higher than ±3SD. As a
result, we excluded five values from the matrix reasoning variable,
four values from the trail making task: time difference variable and
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one value from the composite variable of the N-back task. These
improved the skewness of these variables to acceptable levels
(i.e., skewness less than ±1) except for the trail making task: time
difference variable. We have therefore reported nonparametric cor-
relations for this variable. (Note: We log-transformed the reaction
times before and after data exclusion but this did not help to
reduce the skewness.) All the data exclusions were conducted
independently of the results and, for each variable, we met the
minimal expected sensitivity as defined by our a priori power
analysis.
3.1.2 | Results
We found evidence that the new CRT-V has both good construct
(convergent and discriminant) and predictive validity evidence
(Table 3). First, the CRT-V was moderately correlated with the numer-
ical CRT. A moderate rather than strong correlation was expected as
we tried to minimise the confounding effect of numeracy. Second, the
measure had weak correlations with cognitive abilities (verbal and
non-verbal), working memory and with some of the executive func-
tions (i.e., lack of response inhibition). These were similar to the corre-
lations with the numerical CRT and even though the correlations with
the CRT-V were descriptively slightly lower than those with the
numerical CRT, we found no statistically significant differences
between the correlation magnitudes (see Table 3). These findings are
consistent with a perspective suggesting that scores on the CRT can-
not be reduced to a set of cognitive ability test scores, although these
constructs play an important role in its predictive power (Blacksmith,
Yang, Behrend, & Ruark, 2019; Frederick, 2005). Third, the CRT-V and
the numerical CRT were both weakly correlated with actively open-
minded thinking and not correlated with need for cognition. Faith in
intuition was significantly more correlated with the numerical CRT
than with the CRT-V. Mixed evidence exists about the correlation
between faith in intuition and the CRT, but correlations with the need
for cognition have been relatively stable (Alós-Ferrer &
Hügelschäfer, 2016; Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016).
These low correlations might have occurred because the need for
TABLE 3 Construct validity of the verbal and numerical CRT (zero-order correlations)
Difference between the two correlationsb
Variable M (SD) Verbal CRT (r)a Numerical CRT (r)a t p value
Verbal CRT 4.21 (2.81) – .41*** – –
Convergent and discriminant validity
Numerical CRT 2.37 (1.97) .41*** – – –
Vocabulary 41.62 (8.87) .34*** .32*** 0.34 .731
Matrix reasoning 29.46 (2.92) .30*** .40*** −1.59 .114
Set shifting (ms) 10577.40 (74317.84) .02 .01 0.14 .891
Inhibition (lack of) 63.13 (25.57) −.16** −.14* −0.36 .722
Working memory 0.31 (2.02) .34*** .40*** −1.00 .317
Open minded think 3.81 (0.47) .21*** .33*** −1.81 .071
Faith in intuition 3.61 (0.70) .04 −.23*** 4.30 <.001
Need for cognition 3.52 (0.60) .01 .10 −1.35 .178
Numeracy 8.66 (1.86) .36*** .51*** −2.59 .010
Predictive validity
Belief bias 3.87 (2.16) −0.27*** −0.46*** 3.26 .001
Denominator neglect 2.46 (0.99) −0.19** −0.28*** 1.38 .169
Bayesian reasoning 0.06 (0.23) 0.18** 0.23*** −0.88 .382
Risk preference 3.35 (1.93) 0.07 0.23*** −2.49 .013
Time preference 2.43 (1.53) 0.15* 0.21** −0.82 .411
Moral reasoning 3.80 (1.27) 0.12 0.21** −1.38 .169
Note. n ranged from 265 to 270.
aAll the correlations are Pearson product–moment correlations except for the correlations with variables Set Shifting (where we used Kendall's tau) and
Bayesian Reasoning (where we used a point-biserial correlation).
bTo calculate the differences between the two correlations, we used comparisons for two dependent groups with overlapping correlations using Williams'
method as implemented in R package ‘cocor’ (Diedenhofen & Musch, 2015).
*p < .05.
**p < .01
***p < .001.
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cognition and faith in intuition scales had only five items each,
whereas other research has typically used more robust measures
(e.g., a 20-item version).
Critically, numeracy was significantly less correlated with the
CRT-V than with the numerical CRT. The verbal measure was still
weakly correlated with numeracy, and this might be because
(a) numeracy is sharing variance with cognitive ability, executive func-
tions and thinking dispositions, and (b) both the CRT-V and numeracy
are verbal problems that require problem comprehension and solving
skills (Kintsch, 1988). We ran a series of hierarchical regression ana-
lyses on the subset of complete cases (n = 247) to test the former
explanation. The model featuring numeracy as well as cognitive ability,
executive functions and thinking dispositions as predictors still
predicted significantly more CRT-V performance than the same model
without numeracy, ΔF(1, 237) = 9.98, p = .002. This was also the case
when we reran the same models featuring the numerical instead of
the CRT-V, ΔF(1, 237) = 38.73, p < .001. However, the commonality
analysis (using R package ‘yhat’, Nimon, Lewis, Kane, & Haynes, 2008)
indicated that numeracy accounted for only 3.2% of the unique vari-
ance and 8.2% of the common variance in CRT-V performance but for
10.2% of the unique variance and 16.6% of the common variance in
numerical CRT performance. Hence, the correlation of the CRT-V with
numeracy is partly explained by the association of numeracy with cog-
nitive ability, executive functions and thinking disposition. The
remaining small unique variance explained by numeracy might be
associated with more specific problem comprehension and solving
skills, but that could not be tested here.
We also found evidence that the CRT-V has good predictive
validity (Table 3). The overall pattern of the correlations between the
CRT-V and the six outcome variables was similar to the correlations
between the numerical CRT and the six outcome variables. The corre-
lations were slightly weaker with the CRT-V than with the numerical
CRT. The CRT-V significantly predicted four outcome variables (i.e., it
did not predict moral reasoning and risk preference), whereas the
numerical CRT predicted all six variables. The correlations for belief
bias and risk preference were significantly lower for the CRT-V com-
pared with the numerical CRT.
To test the incremental validity of the CRT-V over and above
other cognitive processing variables, we ran a series of hierarchical
regression analyses, in which all convergent and discriminant valid-
ity variables (see Table 4) were entered as predictors in a succes-
sive and structured way to predict a composite rational thinking
variable. Aligned with the recommendations of Westfall and
Yarkoni (2016), we restrict ourselves here to the claims concerning
the incremental validity of the measures (not constructs), because
we do not have sufficient statistical power to run a set of struc-
tural equation models. We developed the composite rational think-
ing variable following the strategy used in prior research (Toplak
et al., 2014). In a subset of complete cases (n = 253), we recoded
the three outcome variables that have a correct response according
to a normative model (i.e., belief bias, denominator neglect and
Bayesian reasoning). We recoded them so that higher scores repre-
sented more rational thinking (i.e., reversed coded belief bias and
denominator neglect), transformed them into z scores and aggre-
gated them into one composite rational thinking variable. The
internal consistency (Cronbach's α = 0.37) of this composite vari-
able was low, but similar to the consistency of such composite var-
iables of rational thinking reported in prior research (e.g., Toplak
et al., 2011). We successively entered the convergent/discriminant
validity variables: the initial model consisted of cognitive ability
variables only (Model 1), to which we added the executive function
variables (Model 2), to which we added numeracy (Model 3), to
which we added thinking disposition variables (Model 4) and finally
we either added the numerical CRT (Model 5A) or the CRT-V
(Model 5B). The findings (Table 4) indicate that each block contrib-
uted to a significant increase in the explained variance except the
thinking dispositions block. Critically, adding the numerical CRT or
the CRT-V contributed significantly to the explained variance,
above and beyond the contribution of the measures of cognitive
abilities, executive functions, numeracy and thinking dispositions.
When we ran a commonality analysis (Nimon et al., 2008), we
found that the numerical CRT accounted for 4.6% unique variance
and 19.3% common variance and the CRT-V accounted for 1.6%
unique variance and 8.6% common variance. Our findings thus
TABLE 4 Cognitive predictors of rational thinking (composite variable)
F p value Multiple R2 ΔF/ΔR2 p value numerical CRT models ΔF/ΔR2 p value verbal CRT models
1. Cognitive abilities block 18.08 p < .001 .13 – –
2. Executive functions block 10.20 p < .001 .17 5.39/.045 p = .001 5.16/.045 p = .002
3. Numeracy block 14.68 p < .001 .26 33.44/.093 p < .001 32.02/.093 p < .001
4. Thinking dispositions block 10.73 p < .001 .28 2.50/.021 p = .060 2.40/.021 p = .069
5A. Numerical CRT 11.93 p < .001 .33 16.50/.046 p < .001 –
5B: Verbal CRT 10.39 p < .001 .30 – 5.52/.016 p = .020
Note: This analysis was run only on complete cases (n = 253). The effect of blocks varies slightly for the numerical and the verbal CRTs due to fluctuations
in multicollinearity relationships. The cognitive abilities block comprises WASI vocabulary and WASI matrix; the executive functions block comprises set
shifting (trail making test), response inhibition (stop signal task) and working memory (N-back task); the numeracy block comprises only numeracy, and the
thinking dispositions block comprises actively open-minded thinking, need for cognition and faith in intuition.
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further support the incremental validity of the CRT-V as a mea-
sure, because it is similar in structure to the numerical CRT in
predicting rational thinking (Toplak et al., 2011, 2014). The CRT-V
shares variance with, but cannot be reduced to, the measures of
cognitive abilities, executive functions, numeracy and thinking
dispositions.
3.2 | Study 5
To extend the predictive validity of the CRT-V, we conducted an addi-
tional lab study, in which we focused on (a) decision-making style and
(b) receptivity to profound bullshit (Pennycook, Cheyne, et al., 2015).
We leveraged a 14-day long diary study to devise a very realistic mea-
sure of decision-making style, whereby each day people reported their
own decisions and assessed their reflective or intuitive nature. First,
we hypothesised that the CRT-V would be positively related to the
numerical CRT. Second, we hypothesised that the numerical CRT, as
well as the CRT-V, would positively predict the reflective style of
decision-making. Third, we expected that the numerical CRT and the
CRT-V would negatively predict the higher receptivity to profound
bullshit. We did not have any expectations regarding the attenuation
of the correlation because both variables are relatively unexplored in
terms of their association with the numerical component of the
numerical CRT.
3.2.1 | Method
Participants and design
We aimed to recruit at least 84 participants in order to detect at least
a weak correlation of r = −.30, assuming α = .05, 1 − β = .80, and con-
servatively a two-tailed test (Faul et al., 2007). This is a very conserva-
tive estimate because we used multilevel models, where lower
standard errors can be expected, to estimate the relationship between
the CRTs and predicted variables. Initially, 90 participants recruited
from a student pool commenced the research study by completing a
1-h lab study. This was followed up a week later by 14 days of daily
diary entries. Participants were paid £20 for complete participation
(£6 for the initial 1-h lab study and £1 for each of the 14 days 10-min
diary entries). The participants were mostly women (77.8% women),
their age ranged from 18 to 54 years (M = 24.1, SD = 6.5 years), and
they were white (47.8%), Asian/Pacific Islander (27.8%), black (14.4%)
or some other ethnic background (10%). The design of the study was
correlational.
Materials and procedure
After providing informed consent, participants completed a 1-h lab
study. For the purposes of our study, they completed the three-item
version of the numerical CRT (Frederick, 2005) and the 10-item ver-
sion of the CRT-V. The internal consistency for the numerical CRT
was acceptable (Cronbach's α = 0.77) and good for the CRT-V
(Cronbach's α = 0.84). The items for both tests were presented in
random order. A few days later, participants were invited to complete
a set of various tasks in a 14-day diary study. For this study, partici-
pants were first asked to recall and describe the decision/choice of
that day and assess their style of deciding on an intuitive-analytical
dimension. The analytical vs. intuitive decision style was assessed by
seven items (e.g., ‘I weighed up the pros and cons before making the
decision’). The items were inspired by items found in the international
personality item pool (International Personality Item Pool: A Scientific
Collaboratory for the Development of Advanced Measures of Person-
ality Traits and Other Individual Differences, 2018). Participants pro-
vided their judgment on a 5-point Likert scale (1: strongly disagree, 2:
somewhat disagree, 3: neither agree nor disagree, 4: somewhat agree, 5:
strongly agree). The scale had a satisfactory internal consistency
(Cronbach's α = 0.78). The average score ranged from 1 to 5; higher
scores indicated a preference for analytical thinking style. Participants
assessed their decision/choice every day of the 14 days. We have
coded the description of the decision—whether the participants
described a decision. After removing 22 duplicate invalid entries, out
of 961 decisions, 59 did not describe an actual decision (e.g., ‘none’)
and 902 described an actual decision (e.g., ‘whether to take a room
or not’).
To measure participants' receptivity to profound bullshit, partici-
pants assessed the profoundness of five statements (e.g., ‘perceptual
reality transcends subtle truth’) selected from the bullshit receptivity
scale (Pennycook, Cheyne, et al., 2015, see Supporting information)
on a 5-point Likert scale (1: not at all profound, 2: somewhat profound,
3: fairly profound, 4: definitely profound, 5: very profound). They did this
on five occasions, randomly determined, during the 14 days. The scale
had satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach's α = 0.67). The aver-
age score ranged from 1 to 5; higher scores indicated a higher recep-
tivity to profound bullshit.
Results and discussion
We observed a moderate and statistically significant correlation
between the numerical and verbal CRTs, r = .53, p < .001. This
supports the first hypothesis about the construct similarity of the
CRT-V to the numerical CRT. Contrary to our expectations in the
second hypothesis, we found that the numerical and verbal CRTs
did not predict decision-making style using a multilevel model with
random intercept and random slope, nested within participants and
days, b = −0.06, SE = 0.04, t(50.19) = −1.25, p = .218 and
b = 0.01, SE = 0.02, t(37.26) = 0.31, p = .756, respectively. The
null effect might indicate a true lack of predictive power of the
CRT measures because the CRT only weakly predicts real-life deci-
sions (e.g., Juanchich et al., 2016) or it might reflect methodological
issues associated with the new predicted outcome measure
because it was not validated. However, even though our second
hypothesis was not confirmed, the prediction patterns between the
two tests were very similar (centred around zero), which supported
similar predictive properties between the numerical and verbal
CRTs. Finally, aligned with our third hypothesis concerning recep-
tivity for profound bullshit, we found—using a multilevel model
with random intercept and random slope—that the numerical and
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verbal CRTs negatively predicted the receptivity to profound bull-
shit to a similar extent, b = −0.19, SE = 0.08, t(61.71) = −2.49,
p = .016 and b = −0.10, SE = 0.03, t(46.00) = −3.13, p = 0.003,
respectively. Thus, our results support that the numerical and ver-
bal CRTs have similar predictive properties.
3.3 | Study 6
In this study, we investigated further the predictive validity of the
CRT-V, by focusing on beliefs rather than reasoning, judgments and
decision making and using an online panel rather than students. Many
studies using the numerical CRT used online panels, which raises the
question of whether the similarity of the correlational patterns
between the two CRTs observed in the lab would generalise to online
samples. First, we hypothesised that the numerical and verbal CRTs
will be positively related. Second, we predicted a similar pattern of
prediction of paranormal beliefs for both CRTs. Prior research found a
weak but stable association between cognitive reflection and paranor-
mal beliefs (Pennycook et al., 2012; Sirota & Juanchich, 2018).
Because the CRT-V is less confounded by numeracy—that accounts
for unique variance in paranormal beliefs (Patel, 2017; Sirota &
Juanchich, 2018)—we expected the correlation for the CRT-V to be
attenuated (e.g., the correlation between the numerical CRT and para-
normal beliefs dropped from −27 to −18 when controlling for numer-
acy, Sirota & Juanchich, 2018).
3.3.1 | Method
Participants and design
We aimed to recruit at least 193 participants to be able to detect a
weak correlation of r = −0.2 because we assumed a slightly attenu-
ated correlation between the CRT-V and paranormal beliefs, given
α = .05, 1 − β = .80, and conservatively a two-tailed test (Faul
et al., 2007). Participants from the Prolific Academic online panel were
eligible to participate if their approval rate was at least 90%, they
resided in the United Kingdom and they had not participated in the
previous studies of the lab using the CRT. A sample of 199 participants
completed the online survey. They were reimbursed for the estimated
12-min participation by a flat fee of £1. Following our a priori exclu-
sion criteria, we excluded two participants who did not correctly
answer at least two out of three bogus questions (Meade &
Craig, 2012). None of the participants was excluded due to time
exclusion (i.e., completing the survey in less than one-third of the
median time, Mdn = 13.1 min). Hence, the final sample was 197
(56.9% women, age ranged from 18 to 64 years, M = 33.8,
SD = 12.3 years). The sample was heterogeneous in terms of educa-
tion (0.5% had not finished high school, 36.0% had finished high
school, 47.7% had an undergraduate degree, 9.6% had a master's
degree and 6.1% had a doctoral or professional degree) and occupa-
tion (32.5% were unemployed, homemakers or students, 24.9% were
working as managers and professionals, 11.2% were working in sales
and office, 8.1% were working in service and the remaining 23.3%
were in some other occupation category). The design of the study
was correlational.
Materials and procedure
After providing informed consent, participants solved the seven-item
version of the numerical CRT (Toplak et al., 2014; Cronbach's
α = 0.78) and the 10 items of the CRT-V (Cronbach's α = 0.85). We
used an extended version of the numerical CRT—that includes the
three initial problems and four new problems because it has a better
internal consistency and less skewed data towards 0 than the three-
item version. The presentation order of the tests and the items was
randomised. We assessed paranormal beliefs across different domains
(e.g., witchcraft, superstition and spiritualism) with the revised para-
normal belief scale (Tobacyk, 2004). Participants expressed their
agreement with 26 statements (e.g., ‘It is possible to communicate
with the dead’) on a seven-item Likert scale (1: strongly disagree, 2:
moderately disagree, 3: slightly disagree, 4: uncertain, 5: slightly agree, 6:
moderately agree, 7: strongly agree). The scale had excellent internal
consistency (Cronbach's α = 0.94). The average index ranged from
1 to 7; higher values indicated stronger paranormal beliefs. We also
measured careless responding by inserting three bogus items (e.g., ‘I
have never brushed my teeth, respond with “strongly disagree” for
this item’) into the questionnaire in fixed positions. Finally, partici-
pants completed some socio-demographic questions and were
debriefed.
3.3.2 | Results and discussion
We observed a moderate and statistically significant positive correla-
tion between the numerical and verbal CRTs, r = .42, p < .001. Again,
this further supports the construct similarity of the CRT-V with the
numerical CRT. We observed a weak negative correlation between
the numerical CRT and paranormal beliefs as well as a weak negative
correlation between the CRT-V and paranormal beliefs (Figure 2). As
expected, both correlations were in the predicted directions and were
both statistically significantly different from zero, t(195) = − 5.73,
p < .001; t(195) = − 2.29, p = .023, respectively. The correlations were
similarly weak and alike when using nonparametric Spearman correla-
tions (ρ = −.39 and −.16, respectively). The correlation of paranormal
beliefs with the numerical CRT, as predicted, was larger than the one
with the CRT-V (Figure 2), z = −2.99, p = .003 (Diedenhofen &
Musch, 2015). Thus, the CRT-V predicted negative paranormal beliefs,
similarly to the way that the numerical CRT did, however, the correla-
tion was attenuated.
3.4 | Study 7
In this study, we investigated the test–retest reliability of the
CRT-V. Test–retest reliability is recognised as an important aspect
of reliability (AERA et al., 2014), however, to our knowledge, this
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aspect of reliability has not been routinely investigated for the
CRTs. To assess the test–retest reliability, we invited the partici-
pants who completed Study 6 to take part in a new study for
2 weeks (e.g., Furr, 2017) after they submitted the Study 6 ques-
tionnaire. We expected to find a high test–retest reliability of the
new CRT-V, similar to the seven-item numerical CRT. We also
expected a positive relationship between the verbal and numerical
CRTs in their second measurement.
3.4.1 | Methods
Participants and design
The Prolific Academic online workers who completed Study 6 were
eligible to participate (n = 197); they were all invited by email to
participate in this study 2 weeks after completing Study 6. A sam-
ple of 158 participants completed the online survey, from which
we were able to match 155 participants via their ID number
(i.e., three participants failed to provide an ID number that could
be matched with the original list of IDs). This sample size enabled
us to detect a weak correlation of r = 0.22, assuming α = .05,
1 − β = .80, and conservatively a two-tailed test (Faul et al., 2007).
The sample consisted of 56.8% women; age ranged from 18 to
64 years, M = 35.1, SD = 12.7 years. The sample was heteroge-
neous in terms of education (37.4% had finished high school,
45.2% had an undergraduate degree, 10.3% had a master's degree
and 7.1% had a doctoral or professional degree) and occupation
(32.3% were unemployed, homemakers or students, 26.5% were
working as managers and professionals, 9.0% were working in sales
and office, 5.2% were working in service and the remaining 27.0%
were in some other occupation category). The participants were
reimbursed for the estimated 10-min participation by a flat fee of
£0.85. The design of the study was correlational.
Materials and procedure
After providing informed consent, participants solved the seven-item
version of the CRT (Toplak et al., 2014) and the CRT-V (10 items). The
order of presentation of the two tests and the items was randomised.
The internal consistency for the numerical CRT was acceptable
(Cronbach's α = 0.75) and good for the CRT-V (Cronbach's α = 0.86).
Finally, participants completed some socio-demographic questions
and were debriefed.
F IGURE 2 Zero-order correlations between paranormal beliefs, the numerical cognitive reflection test (CRT) and the verbal CRT. Note. r—
Pearson correlation coefficient, 95% CI—95% confidence intervals
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Results and discussion
We found a moderate and statistically significant positive correlation
between the numerical and verbal CRTs in the second measurement,
r = .41, p < .001 (Figure 3). Critically, we found that for both the
numerical and verbal CRTs the performance in test and retest was
highly correlated and similar in size (r = .83 and .82, respectively, Fig-
ure 3), z = 0.28, p = .776 (using the cocor R package, Diedenhofen &
Musch, 2015). Thus, the CRT-V had very high test–retest reliability,
which was virtually identical to the reliability of the numerical CRT.
3.5 | Study 8
Prior research found moderate correlations between the numerical
CRT and mathematical anxiety, subjective and objective numeracy;
mathematical anxiety and numeracy also accounted for the
observed gender differences in the numerical CRT (Juanchich
et al., 2020; Liberali et al., 2012; Morsanyi, Busdraghi, &
Primi, 2014; Primi et al., 2018). In this preregistered study (https://
aspredicted.org/sx44k.pdf), we investigated the relationship
between the numerical and CRT-V with mathematical anxiety and
subjective numeracy. One could argue that if the CRT-V does not
require mathematical skills then it should not be (or be less) associ-
ated with subjective numeracy and mathematical anxiety. A strong
version of this argument predicts no association of the CRT-V with
mathematical anxiety (Hypothesis 1a) while observing a negative
association of the numerical CRT with mathematical anxiety
(Hypothesis 1b). A weaker version of this argument predicts a
lower negative association of the CRT-V with mathematical anxiety
in comparison with the negative association of the numerical CRT
with mathematical anxiety (Hypothesis 1c). We believe the weaker
version is more realistic because mathematical anxiety is associated
with a range of other variables that might be associated with per-
formance in the CRT-V. For instance, meta-analytical evidence
F IGURE 3 The test–retest reliabilities (2 weeks) for the numerical cognitive reflection test (CRT) (seven-item) and the verbal CRT. Note. 1st—
first measurement, 2nd—second measurement (2 weeks after the first measurement), r—Pearson correlation coefficient, 95% CI—95% confidence
intervals
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showed weak-to-moderate significant correlations between math
anxiety and general anxiety (r = .35), trait anxiety (r = .38), state
anxiety (r = .42) and test anxiety (r = .52) as well as with intelli-
gence (r = −.17) which fuels general problem-solving ability
(Hembree, 1990). Thus, a correlation with mathematical anxiety
might indicate an association with other forms of anxiety (e.g., test
anxiety). Finally, we expected that the CRT-V performance will be
less strongly associated with subjective numeracy compared with
the numerical CRT performance (Hypothesis 2). We did not predict
null association with subjective numeracy because subjective
numeracy is associated with objective numeracy that we found in
Study 4 to be correlated with the CRT-V.
3.5.1 | Method
Participants and design
We aimed to recruit 221 participants to be able to detect a weak
correlation of r = 0.2, given α = .05, 1 − β = .80 using a two-tailed
test (Faul et al., 2007). Participants from the Prolific Academic
online panel were eligible to participate if (a) their approval rate
was at least 95% while having at least two previous submissions,
(b) they were U.K. nationals and (c) they were 18 years old or
older. A sample of 221 participants completed the online survey.
They were paid £0.85 for the estimated 10-min participation. Fol-
lowing our a priori exclusion criteria, none of the participants was
excluded due to time exclusion or incompleteness. The participants
were mostly women (72.9%), and their ages ranged from 18 to
71 years, M = 34.7, SD = 12.4 years. The sample was heteroge-
neous in terms of education (0.9% had not finished high school,
40.3% had finished high school, 42.1% had an undergraduate
degree, 14.5% had a master's degree and 2.3% had a doctoral or
professional degree) and occupation (27.1% were working as man-
agers and professionals, 26.2% were unemployed, homemakers or
students, 9.5% were working in sales and office, 5.0% were retired,
4.5% were working in service and the remaining 27.7% were in
some other occupation category). The design of the study was
correlational.
Materials and procedure
After providing informed consent, participants completed the
numerical CRT, the CRT-V, mathematical anxiety and subjective
numeracy. The presentation order of the tests and the items within
each test was randomised. Participants solved the seven-item
extended version of the numerical CRT with four multiple-choice
options (Sirota & Juanchich, 2018; Toplak et al., 2014). The
multiple-choice version has similar psychometric properties with
the open-ended version, but it is quicker to administer, code, and
it is free from coding mistakes and misclassifications (Sirota &
Juanchich, 2018). The internal consistency was acceptable
(Cronbach's α = 0.74). Participants also solved the 10 items of the
CRT-V that had a good internal consistency (Cronbach's α = 0.88).
Participants assessed their level of anxiety in situations involving
math using the nine-item version of AMAS (Hopko, Mahadevan,
Bare, & Hunt, 2003). Specifically, they assessed their level of anxi-
ety in a situation involving maths (e.g., ‘Taking an examination in a
math course’) on a five-item Likert scale (1: not at all, 2: a little, 3:
a fair amount, 4: much, 5: very much). The scale had excellent inter-
nal consistency (Cronbach's α = 0.92). The average index ranged
from 1 to 5; higher values indicated stronger math anxiety. Partici-
pants also assessed their level of subjective numeracy using a short
three-item version of the subjective numeracy scale (Fagerlin
et al., 2007; McNaughton, Cavanaugh, Kripalani, Rothman, &
Wallston, 2015). Specifically, they rated their skills (e.g., ‘How good
are you at working with fractions?’) on a 6-point Likert scale
(anchored at 1: not good at all and 6: extremely good). The scale
had acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach's α = 0.77). The
average index ranged from 1 to 6; higher values indicated stronger
numeracy. Finally, participants completed some socio-demographic
questions and were debriefed.
3.5.2 | Results and discussion
We observed moderate correlations between the numerical CRT
and subjective numeracy and math anxiety, while we observed only
weak correlations between the CRT-V and subjective numeracy
and math anxiety (Figure 4). We found a statistically significant
weak negative correlation between the CRT-V and math anxiety
(r = −.20), t(219) = −3.02, p = .003 (disconfirming Hypothesis 1a)
and a moderate negative correlation between the numerical CRT
and math anxiety (r = −.38), t(219) = − 6.12, p < .001 (supporting
Hypothesis 1b). The correlation with math anxiety was statistically
significantly lower for the CRT-V than for the numerical CRT,
z = 2.83, p = .005 (supporting Hypothesis 1c, using ‘cocor’ pack-
age). Thus, the pattern was consistent with the weak version of
the argument—the CRT-V compared with the numerical CRT is
much less associated with math anxiety. A similar correlational pat-
tern was observed with subjective numeracy (Figure 4): the
correlation with subjective numeracy was statistically significantly
lower for the CRT-V (r = .15) than for the numerical CRT (r = .46),
z = −4.92, p < .001 (confirming Hypothesis 2). Thus, we found that
math anxiety and subjective numeracy were still correlated with
the CRT-V but only very weakly and substantially and significantly
less than with the numerical CRT.
We believe our findings can be explained as a result of con-
founding with other variables because one does not need any mathe-
matical skills to answer the CRT-V problems. For example, in Sirota &
Juanchich (2018; data available at https://osf.io/mzhyc/), we found a
significant negative correlation between paranormal beliefs
(e.g., witches do exist) and objective numeracy (r = −0.27, p < .001).
Do people require numerical skills to disbelieve actual cases of witch-
craft? We do not think so. A more parsimonious explanation is that
paranormal beliefs are confounded by numeracy, which is sharing var-
iance with other variables such as intelligence and thinking style
(Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006).
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4 | EVIDENCE SYNTHESIS:
MEASUREMENT INVARIANCE, GENDER
EFFECT AND INTUITIVENESS
In this section, we summarise evidence across all studies reported
here to examine three important aspects of the CRT-V: (a) its mea-
surement invariance across gender, age groups and administration
forms, (b) the presence or absence of gender differences and (c) its
intuitiveness measured by the number of intuitive responses
(i.e., intuitive score) and whether this is inversed to the summation
reflectiveness score.
4.1 | Measurement invariance across gender, age
and administration settings
To allow meaningful comparisons between different groups of partici-
pants and administration situations, we leveraged the data reported in
Studies 1–8 to analyse the measurement invariance of the CRT-V
across gender groups (male versus female), age groups (median split,
above 27 years old versus younger) and administration settings (labo-
ratory versus online). Specifically, we tested the base model assessing
the configural (i.e., equivalent factor structure), metric (i.e., the similar-
ity of factor loadings, aka weak factorial equivalence) and scalar
(i.e., equivalent values, aka strong factorial equivalence) measurement
invariance using Mplus with weighted least square mean and variance
adjusted (WLSMV) estimators and theta parameterisation. The same
technique was used to examine the measurement invariance of the
numerical CRT across gender groups so that we could include gender
differences for both the verbal and numerical CRT in a meta-analysis.
In the case of configural invariance, a single factor was specified for
each group (e.g. males and females) while allowing all other parame-
ters to vary. For metric invariance, a second restriction was added: the
factor loading of each item was the same for both groups. Finally, for
scalar equivalence, the intercepts of each item were constrained to be
equal across the groups.
As an indicator of measurement invariance, the chi-square differ-
ence test is overly sensitive to insignificant differences between
F IGURE 4 Correlations between the numerical cognitive reflection test (CRT) (seven-item), the verbal CRT, mathematical anxiety and
subjective numeracy. Note. r—Pearson correlation coefficient, 95% CI—95% confidence intervals
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groups when, as in the present study, large samples are used
(Chen, 2007; Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). Therefore, consistent with
other researchers (Putnick & Bornstein, 2016), we used fit indices as
indicators of measurement invariance. As Putnick and Bornstein
pointed out, there is currently no consensus about the optimum alter-
native fit indices to use, nor the appropriate cut-off values to adopt to
inform measurement invariance. Cheung and Rensvold (2002) and
Chen (2007) suggested a cut-off value for a change in CFI of −.01
(that is, the CFI value for a more restrictive model should not be more
than .01 below the preceding, less restrictive, model), and Chen pro-
poses an equivalent cut-off of .015 for RMSEA. These values, which
are a compromise between more stringent (Meade, Johnson, & Bra-
ddy, 2008) and less stringent alternatives (Rutkowski & Svetina, 2014),
are adopted here.
Based on these RMSEA and CFI cut-off criteria, the CRT-V dem-
onstrated the most stringent, scalar (strong factorial) form of invari-
ance across gender groups, age groups and administration settings
(see Table 5). The measurement invariance of the numerical CRT was
only tested for gender, where it demonstrated scalar invariance (see
Table 5).
4.2 | Gender differences in the verbal and
numerical CRT
In the numerical CRT, cognitive reflection is cofounded with numer-
acy. This is manifested in gender differences for this test—women per-
form less well than men in the numerical CRTs (Juanchich et al., 2020;
Primi et al., 2018). Prior research showed that this gender difference
occurs due to mathematical anxiety and numeracy but not due to
lower cognitive reflection abilities (Juanchich et al., 2020). Here, we
aggregated the data from Studies 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8 (n = 1,233) to
assess the gender difference for both the numerical and the CRT-V.
We expected to find evidence that women performed less well than
men in the numerical CRT but that this would be less or not the case
for the CRT-V because that test does not involve numbers nor require
any mathematical operations to be solved. We meta-analysed the
standardised differences between men and women (positive values
indicate better performance for men) for the numerical and CRT-V.
We used a multiple-endpoints studies approach that deals with the
fact that the responses to the numerical and CRT-V came from the
same participants and were not independent (Olkin & Gleser, 2009)
and used a random effect model as implemented in R package ‘met-
afor’ (Viechtbauer, 2010).
We found evidence of gender effect in the numerical CRT:
Men performed better than women, Hedges' g = 0.29, z = 4.73,
p < .001. Importantly, we found no evidence for gender difference
in the CRT-V, Hedges' g = −0.06, z = −0.95, p = .341 (see
Figure 5). The type of CRT (numerical vs. verbal) was a statistically
significant moderator of the gender difference, QM(2) = 33.47,
p < .001, indicating that a gender difference was significantly
greater for the numerical CRT than for the CRT-V. The test for
residual heterogeneity was not statistically significant, QE
(8) = 15.88, p = .103. Thus, women did not perform as well as
men in the numerical CRT but did perform as well as men in the
CRT-V.
TABLE 5 Measurement invariance of the verbal CRT across gender (together with numerical CRT), age and administration setting
χ2 df p χ2diff df p RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI Δ RMSEA CFI Δ CFI
Verbal CRT
Gender
Configural 108.60 70 .002 - - - .030 [.018, .041] - .995 -
Metric 119.46 79 .002 18.58 9 .029 .029 [.018, .039] −.001 .994 −.001
Scalar 161.70 88 <.001 52.74 9 <.001 .037 [.028, .046] .008 .990 −.004
Age
Configural 98.19 70 .015 - - - .026 [.012, .037] - .996 -
Metric 129.70 79 <.001 23.20 9 .006 .032 [.022, .042] .006 .993 −.003
Scalar 205.21 88 <.001 95.50 9 <.001 .046 [.038, 055] .014 .984 −.009
Administration
Configural 109.57 70 .002 - - - .030 [.019, .041] - .995 -
Metric 122.63 79 .001 20.37 9 .016 .030 [.019, .040] .000 .994 −.001
Scalar 190.51 88 <.001 82.52 9 <.001 .043 [.035, .090] .013 .986 −.008
Numerical CRT
Gender
Configural 52.51 28 .003 - - - .038 [.021, .053] - .990 -
Metric 48.93 34 .047 4.67 6 .586 .023 [.003, .042] −.015 .994 −.004
Scalar 53.98 40 .069 4.77 6 .574 .024 [.000, .039] .001 .994 .000
Note: χ2 = model chi-square, df = degree of freedom, p = p value, χ2diff = model chi-square difference, RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation,
where Δ indicates models difference and 90% CI indicates its 90% confidence intervals; CFI = comparative fit index, where Δ indicates models difference.
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4.3 | Intuitiveness
In this manuscript, we reported the construct validity of cognitive
reflection measured as the sum of the correct responses (i.e., some-
times refer to as ‘reflectiveness’). This is the most common scoring
method of CRT performance. However, a summation score of intui-
tive responses is sometimes reported and therefore the construct
validity of ‘intuitiveness’ might be of interest too. We found a very
strong negative correlation between the reflectiveness and intuitive-
ness score across the studies for the CRT-V, r = −.91, 95% CI [−.90,
−.92] and similar in size to the one observed for the numerical CRT,
r = −.87, 95% CI [−.85, −.88]. So, we can expect a very similar pattern
of correlations of intuitiveness indices with the construct validity vari-
ables, which will be similar in size and in the opposite direction to
those observed for the reflectiveness scores. Indeed, this was the
case. For example, in Study 4, the same conclusion was reached in
terms of the statistical significance of the correlations for 14 out of
16 validity measures except for time preference and moral reasoning
where the correlation for intuitiveness did not reach significance in
contrast with the reflectiveness scores. However, this is likely because
the correlations for reflectiveness were small to start with (e.g., moral
reasoning correlated +.12 with reflectiveness and −.09 for intuitive-
ness). Thus, the intuitiveness score of the CRT-V has a similar con-
struct validity as the reflectiveness score.
5 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the eight studies presented here, we developed and validated a
new measure of cognitive reflection that uses only verbal prob-
lems: the CRT-V. This new measure has 10 items that have a low
initial familiarity, a wrong answer that is intuitively appealing and
one clear correct solution. The CRT-V consistently exhibited desir-
able statistical properties: it had acceptable skewness and kurtosis
and mean scores sat around the middle point of the summation
index. Given the mean is around the middle values of the score,
one would not expect the test to be susceptible to floor effects as
sometimes happens with the numerical CRT. The CRT-V had good
reliability. First, across all the studies reported here, the new mea-
sure exhibited a very good internal consistency that was regularly
higher than the internal consistency observed for the numerical
CRT. Second, the CRT-V was stable over time and its test–retest
correlation was high and identical to that of the numerical CRT.
The CRT-V also had adequate construct validity: it was moderately
correlated with the numerical CRT. In addition, this new measure
of cognitive reflection tapped into the same constructs as its
numerical counterpart: cognitive abilities, executive functions and
working memory and to a great extent thinking dispositions. Criti-
cally, compared with the numerical CRT, the new measure was
much less strongly associated with numerical ability. For this rea-
son, the CRT-V has the added benefit of being free from the gen-
der differences consistently found with the numerical CRT. Finally,
the new test predicted similar outcome variables to the numerical
CRT although not always to the same extent.
Based on these findings we conclude that the CRT-V may be used
to replace or complement existing measures of cognitive reflection
(e.g., Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 2014). One critical distinction from
the previous measures (except for CRT-2, Thomson & Oppenhei-
mer, 2016) is that the current measure is significantly less associated
(even though still correlated) with numeracy while maintaining its high
reliability (in contrast with CRT-2). Prior research pinpointed the issue
of the numeracy confound and called for the establishment of a cogni-
tive reflection measure without this shortcoming (e.g., Pennycook &
Ross, 2016; Primi et al., 2018; Sinayev & Peters, 2015; Thomson &
Oppenheimer, 2016). We believe that the CRT-V provides an answer
to these calls. The remaining weak association with numeracy should
be investigated in future research, but it is likely because both the
CRT-V and numeracy are partly fuelled by the same general abilities
F IGURE 5 A forest plot of gender effect for the numerical cognitive reflection test (CRT) (Panel A) and the verbal CRT (Panel B)
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(e.g., cognitive ability, working memory). A probable consequence of
the weaker association with numeracy (Juanchich et al., 2020; Primi
et al., 2018) is that the CRT-V is free from gender differences. We
believe that this is a desirable property of any test and is also impor-
tant for the fair evaluation of gender differences in cognitive reflec-
tion (AERA et al., 2014). This finding resembles the results of a lack of
gender differences in CRT-2 (Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). How-
ever, we cannot be sure whether the gender differences (Hedge's
g = .26) in favour of men found with CRT-2 (n = 133) would not be
statistically significant if the test used there had more power. In our
studies, the lack of significant gender differences cannot be attributed
to low power, given that we achieved high aggregated power by con-
ducting the small-scale meta-analysis (n = 1,012).
Despite the general similarity of the numerical and verbal CRTs
regarding their predictive power, we also observed a pattern of stron-
ger (even though not necessarily statistically significantly stronger)
associations of predicted variables with the numerical CRT than with
the CRT-V. There are several possible explanations for this. First, it
might be an expression of sampling error and, as such, it would not
deserve psychological interpretation. This seems unlikely, however,
because the pattern is relatively stable and always occurs in the same
direction. Second, it might be due to the role that numeracy plays in
the numerical CRT—numeracy might amplify the predictive power of
the numerical CRT. However, we would then observe this pattern
occurring only for the variables where numeracy plays a significant
role, which is not always the case (Pennycook & Ross, 2016; Sinayev
& Peters, 2015). Thus, such explanations can only partially account for
the pattern in our data. Third, the lower predictive power of the
CRT-V might be because the CRT-V taps into a more specific part of
cognitive reflection. Cognitive reflection is usually treated as a unitary
construct; however, cognitive reflection might involve different pro-
cesses such as the analytical processes associated with detecting
errors and the analytical processes associated with correcting the
detected errors or other similar architectures (De Neys &
Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015b). It might be
that the numerical CRT consists of hard-to-detect and hard-to-correct
problems (especially for people with lower numeracy and/or high
mathematical anxiety), whereas the CRT-V consists of hard-to-detect
but easy-to-correct problems. For example, it is relatively easy to cor-
rect yourself once you have suppressed the initial intuitive answer
(i.e., ‘Nunu’) to the ‘Mary's father’ problem, whereas after suppressing
the intuitive answer to the ‘bat and ball’ problem (i.e., ‘10 cents’), one
still has a long way to go before giving the correct answer because it
requires figuring out a nontrivial calculation. Aligned with this proposi-
tion, process-oriented evidence showed that 39% of people reflected
upon their incorrect answers to the numerical CRT problems but were
not able to come up with the correct answers (Szaszi, Szollosi, Palfi, &
Aczel, 2017). Even though we did not provide any evidence for differ-
ent aspects of cognitive reflection to be activated with the CRT-V,
this is a testable hypothesis and, in our view, the leading explanation—
along with the one postulating role of numeracy—in accounting for
the slight gap in predictive power between the verbal and the
numerical CRTs.
Four limitations of the current research deserve readers' atten-
tion. First, even though our items were carefully selected so they
would have low initial familiarity and require only common cultural
knowledge, with the continuous use of the measure and its adap-
tation to other cultures and languages, familiarity might become an
issue and some items might become problematic. For instance, the
Moses problem requires specific cultural knowledge and might not
be transferable to some non-Christian cultures. Thus, future
research should address the issue of previous exposure and its
effect on predictive validity and critically examine the inclusion of
the item as the time is progressing. Careful consideration for item
inclusivity and pretesting will be required when the items will be
adapted to different cultures. Second, even though we used a wide
range of measures to test the CRT-V's construct validity covering
different domains, the list was not exhaustive. Future research
should, therefore, focus on other outcome variables and investigate
whether the CRT-V predicts these more or less successfully than
the numerical CRT. Third, we used nonrepresentative samples of
English-speaking participants in our research: university student
samples and nonrandom samples from a general adult population.
It would be important to further establish the robustness of the
predictive validity of the CRT-V in random samples drawn from a
general adult population. We believe that our test will be an excel-
lent measure of cognitive reflection especially in nonstudent
populations that lack mathematical skills and/or suffer from mathe-
matical anxiety. Finally, we adopted here a classical testing theory
approach when selecting the initial items and IRT in the factor
structure phase; the consistent use of the latter approach might
have been a better approach because it offers many advantages
over the traditional approach. Future research might usefully scruti-
nise the CRT-V using an IRT approach.
To conclude, we developed and validated a new measure of
cognitive reflection without using mathematical problems: the
CRT-V. The test has desirable statistical properties. We found
satisfactory evidence for construct validity as well as for reliability
(internal consistency and test–retest reliability). We believe that
the test can complement existing tests of cognitive reflection and
that it will be especially appropriate for use in people who
are relatively poorly educated and/or who are mathematically
anxious.
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